A PROTEST AGAINST ADMINISTERING CRIMINAL
LAW BY INJUNCTION.-THE DEBS' CASE.
By WILuAm DRAPER Lzwis, Ph.D.

On the i 4 th inst. Eugene V. Debs, President of the Ameri-can Railway Union, was sent to prison for six months, in the.
county jail in Chicago, by Judge

WILLIAM

A. WOODS, of the

Federal Court, for contempt of an injunction. 'Other members
of the Railway Union were given three months each. The
injunction which, it is claimed, Debs disregarded was the
. elebrated omnibus injunction issued by the Federal Circuit
Court last summer during the Pullman strike.restraining all
persons from interfering with the property and trains of
certain railroads running out of Chicago. Judge WOODS
said in his opinion, "If the injunction was, for any reason,
totally invalid, no violation or disregard of it codld constitute
a punishable contempt; but, if the court acquired jurisdiction
and did not exceed its powers in the particular case, no irregularity or error in the procedure or in the order itself could
justify disobedience of the writ." He maintains the court's
right of jurisdiction to issue such an injunction by many quotations from English and American decisions. Those who
desire to follow the principal cases should read the article on
"Equity Jurisdiction as Applied to Crimes and Misdemeanors,"
by the late RICHARD C. McMURTRIE, "Esq. It was, in some
sense, the finest short article which that eminent jurist ever
wrote (AM. L. REG. & REV., vol. 31, p. I).
The editorial
notes by the present writer in the same volume (p. 782) show
-the historical development of the law on the subject. It is not
now intended to take up those decisions again. Suffice it to
say here that the position of Judge WOODS is supported by
several cases decided in other Federal Courts, and by an
-expression of Mr. Justice MILLER in the Supreme Court of the
United States, as also by an English case decided by Vice-Chancellor MALINS. The principal case in the Federal Courts
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is that of the Cwur D'Alene Consolidated.ining Co. v. Miners'
Union of Wander et al., reported in 5 r Fed. Rep. 26o (see
A-,i. L. REG. & REV. 7io). This case grew out of the trouble
in the mining districts of Idaho. The striking miners were in
possession of the mines, were preventing the new employ~s
from working, and, indeed, had carried the new men over the
borders of the Territory into Montana. The court granted an
injunction, at the request of the company, restraining the
members of the Union from further interfering with, threatening or molesting its employ~s or entering its works. There
was no arrest or imprisonment as the result of any violation.
Another celebrated case in the District Courts is.
where
Judge BREWER committed a man for 'contempt of court for
interfering with the running of engines on a road which was.
in the hands of a receiver: United States v. Kane, 23 Fed.
Rep. 748. The receivership, however, was made the main
The English case referred to is
ground of the decision.
that of Sprig/4ead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law Rep., 6 Eq.
551, where Vice-Chancellor MALINS issued an injunction
restraining the members of the Union on a strike from
placarding the town with posters asking workmen -not to
work for their old employers. This case has been made the
basis of the principal American cases. The case in the
Supreme Court of the United States was that of Eilenbecken v.
The District Court of Plynoutt County, reported in 139 U. S.
31. A statute of the State of Iowa declared that the selling
of liquor was a nuisance, and that any citizen in the county
where liquor was sold or thought to be sold, could apply for
an injunction to restrain the alleged seller. The question of
the contempt of this injunction was to be tried by the judge
issuing the same on proof by affidavit of the fact of violation.
One Eilenbecken, having been convicted in this way, the case
was taken to the Supreme Court of the United -States, the
principal assignment of error being that the statute in question
was void because, in effect, it deprived the plaintiffs, who were
charged with selling liquor, "of the equal protection of the
'laws, and it prejudiced the rights and privileges of that
particular class of persons, and denies to them the right of
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trial byj uiy." The court held that the record did not show
that the plaintiffs would have been denied the right of trial by
jury had they demanded it. This view of the case, which was
perhaps taken to avoid meeting the most serious question of
constitutional law that had presented itself to the court for
years, deprives the case of weight as an authority. Mr. Justice
MILLER, however, went on to say, "We know of no hindrance
in the Constitution of the United States to the form of proceedings, or to the court in which this remedy shall be had."
It was this expression which excited the ire of Mr. MCMURTRIE,'
.and on which he based the article above referred to.
Apart from these decisions, let us examine for a moment
what the real question involved in all these cases is, and the
.arguments which can be made on one side and the other.
The question presented by the Debs' Case is shortly this: Can
the fact that the crime with which the man is charged injured
property and was a publid nuisance, justify the court in depriving him of the right of trial by jury? The strongest argument in favor of the affirmative to this question is to be found
in the facts of the Debs' Case. The court, before they issued
the injunction, had ample evidence that a large body of
persons in the community, some of whom had no connection
with the railroads in and near Chicago, were by public meet,ings, intimidation and actual violence, preventing the railroads
from performing the public duties for which they were created
.and greatly injuring their property. The actions of Debs
and his followers w s a public nuisance of the most serious
and alarming kind. It is the duty of the court to protect
property and abate nuisances injurious to property. Therefore, it is said that they had a right to issue the injunction,
and the injunction being issued, a right to examine into any
alleged contempt by the methods ordinarily used by a court
of equity when investigating facts. And should the judge on
-such an examination conclude- that the injunction had been
violated he had a right to imprison for any length of time he
saw fit those who, in his judgment, had disregarded his order.
The argument, on the other side of the question, may
,be stated somewhat as follows: Admitting that Debs and
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his followers were acting in such a way as to be a public
nuisance, and to threaten private property, and admitting
that the court of equity is especially concerned in the protection of property, it does not follow that this property is
under the protection of the courts, or the nuisance of such a
character that the c6urt of its own motion can take cognizance of it. It is only property in a particular position, or
threatened with injury from a particular source, which equity
can interfere to protect. For instance, if I come into a court
of equity claiming that my tenant for a term of years, with no
right to commit waste, is cutting down the tree§ on my place,
equity will issue an injunction until the rights of the matter
can be ascertained. The basis of this action is, that it is the
business of the courts to see that one claiming to be the
owner of property shall not destroy it or injure it, if another
claims an interest in it, until the mutual rights of the parties
are determined. It is the claim of right on both sides which
gives the court of equity jurisdiction. If a robber threatens
to break in my house by night and plunder my premises, did
ever any one hear of my going into a court of equity to
restrain him?
Again, that courts have jurisdiction to restrain a nuisance is
admitted by all; but that alone is a nuisance which the courts
will restrain which results from a man's action with his own
property so as to adversely affect the property of other private
persons or the property of the state. The following instances
illustrate what is meant by this distinction. If a railroad company, or persons pretending to be incorporated, and pretending
to have authority to lay tracks over private property, commence to do so, the state, or any person whose property is
adversely affected, claiming that the pretended corporation,
either does not exist, or has not the right which it claims, can
obtain from the court a temporary injunction until'those rights
are determined.
Again, if a man, claiming that a street is his private way,
obstructs the free passage of the public, the state can obtain
an injunction restraining him from doing so until the rights of.
himself and the public in the way are determined. Or again,
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if one railroad claims that another which is about to cross its
tracks has no right to do so, and undertakes to prevent by
force of arms the workmen of the first company from crossing
their tracks, an injunction can be obtained restraining both
parties from altering their position until the question of right
has been settled. As to questions of a man's use of his own
property which injures the property of others, we can mention
a man being restrained by injunction from carrying on a
business on his property which is a nuisance to the adjoining
owners or to the community. But it is urged that the underlying thought of all these instances is, that the man who is
restrained by injunction, is acting as he does under a claim
of right in property: And that by so doing, he has enabled one
who disputes that right, to bring him into a civil court to determine the disputed question. Pending that determination, the
property being peculiarly under the care of the court, can
be protected 'by injunction, which the court has the summary
right to enforce by commitment for contempt. Debs and the
Chicago strikers of last summer made no claim to legal
interest in property. Their actions were either innocent or
criminal. It is alleged that they were criminal. The constitution provides that no man shall be judged guilty of a crime
without indictment and trial by jury and all its attendant
incidents.
This view of the case is that which appeals to the writer.
The circumstances of the Chicago strikers either did or did
not leave the administration of criminal .justice and the preserving of social order within the ordinary power of the
criminal court and the executive branch of the government.
4 as is probable, the executive arm of the government,
backed by the ordinary processes of the criminal courts, was
not sufficient to protect property and life, then the case should
have been treated, as on those facts it was, an exceptional
case, and martial law declared. There seems to us to have
been no necessity to, strain the principles of the procedure of
the civil courts, and to make a precedent which will be used
over and over again to undermine the most valuable of the
safeguards of individual liberty--the trial by jury.

